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Abstract European law has recognised the need for international cross-disciplinary
collaboration to both identify, locate and safeguard victims and prevent, investigate
and prosecute online child exploitation and abuse (OCSEA). However, there is evi-
dence that these crimes are continuing to increase and develop in step with techno-
logical advances. Changing the behaviour of both perpetrators and victims is both
challenging and expensive and there is little evidence of what works to reduce these
crimes. In this paper an argument is presented that changing the environments which
support OCSEA is necessary if we are to detect and manage these crimes, and more
importantly prevent them.
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1 Introduction
In a report commissioned by the Council of Europe it was noted that Online Child
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (OCSEA) does not respect national jurisdictions and
that there was a need for national and international cross-disciplinary collaboration
to identify, locate and safeguard victims and prevent, investigate and prosecute these
crimes.1 It was also acknowledged that any such co-operation would require the abil-
ity to respond to technological change and the corresponding changes in offender
behaviour. Perhaps the most important international law instrument dedicated to the
1Carr, J. [8].
B E. Quayle
Ethel.Quayle@ed.ac.uk
1 Professor of Forensic Clinical Psychology, COPINE Research, Clinical & Health Psychology,
School of Health in Social Science, University of Edinburgh, Teviot Place, Edinburgh, UK
E. Quayle
rights of the child is the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)2 with
Article 34 of the CRC requiring states to ‘protect the child from all forms of sexual
exploitation and sexual abuse’. It also makes specific reference to preventing ‘the ex-
ploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials’. The Optional
Protocol to the CRC on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornog-
raphy (OPSC) which followed covered many forms of sexual abuse and exploitation
and specifically referred to child pornography.3 Article 2(c) of the OPSC defines
child pornography as ‘any representation, of whatever means, of a child engaged in
real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of
a child for primarily sexual purposes’ which provided a wider definition that other in-
ternational instruments.4 Gillespie has argued that the region which has paid the most
attention to the issue of child exploitation and in particular child sexual abuse mate-
rials (CSAM) is Europe, with both the Council of Europe and the European Union
enacting international instruments that specifically relate to the issue of the sexual
exploitation of a child, including through child pornography.5
The Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Children against Sex-
ual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse CETS 201 (Lanzarote Convention) and the Con-
vention on Cybercrime CETS 185 (Budapest Convention) provide comprehensive
benchmarks for both criminal law and procedural law standards to prevent and com-
bat OCSEA.6 They build on the international standards set out by the UNRC and
the OPSC designed to protect children. Articles 18 to 29 of the Lanzarote Conven-
tion and Article 9 of the Budapest Convention set out the substantive criminal law
and definitions of offences required to be transposed into national law. This conven-
tion was the first instrument to establish the various forms of child sexual abuse as
criminal offences including abuse committed in the home or family, with the use of
force, coercion or threats. The articles specifically relevant to OCSEA offences are
Articles 20 to 23 of the Lanzarote Convention, which focus specifically in Article 20
on criminalising the production, distribution and possession of, and knowing access
to child pornography (increasingly referred to as CSAM7), offences concerning the
participation of a child in pornographic performances (Article 21), the corruption of
children through intentional exposure to sexual activities (Article 22) and the solic-
itation of children for sexual purposes (Article 23). In the European Union, Article
6.2 of the Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and Council on Com-
bating the Sexual Abuse and Sexual Exploitation of Children and Child Pornography
requires EU Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that attempts
to solicit a child to provide CSAM are punishable. Article 23 of the Lanzarote Con-
vention requires states to criminalise the intentional proposal of an adult to meet
a child for the purpose of unlawful sexual activity. The 2015 Opinion of the Lan-
zarote Committee on Article 23 of the Convention noted that “The solicitation of
2UN Commission on Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child., 7 March 1990, E/CN.4/
RES/1990/74.
3A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000.
4Gillespie, A.A. [25].
5Gillespie [26].
6Baines, V. [2].
7Greijer, S. and Doek, J. [28].
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children through information and communication technologies does not necessarily
result in a meeting in person. It may remain online and nonetheless cause serious
harm to the child. The sexual offences which are intentionally perpetrated during an
online meeting through communication technologies are often linked to the produc-
tion, possession and transmission of child pornography” (p6).8 Of some importance
here is that the assumption of harm which underpins most legislation largely relates
to the production of CSAM9 and until recently there has been little research that has
explored the ‘additional harms’ that come through the possession and distribution of
this material.10,11,12,13
In a joint initiative by the EU and the United States, in 2012 54 countries from
around the world signed up to a Global Alliance against Child Sexual Abuse On-
line. They committed to key policy targets that aim at: a larger number of rescued
victims, more effective prosecution, and an overall reduction in the number of child
sexual abuse images available online. The Global Alliance subsequently merged with
the UK’s WeProtect initiative to form the WeProtect Global Alliance to end child
sexual exploitation online, which brought together over 80 governments, 20 global
technology companies and 24 leading international and non-governmental organisa-
tions to protect children from sexual exploitation online. The Global Alliance (2016)
produced, ‘Preventing and Tackling Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (CSEA):
A Model National Response’ to provide guidelines and support on how to achieve
the commitments. The Model was intended to enable a country to assess its current
response and identify gaps, prioritise national efforts to fill gaps and enhance inter-
national understanding and cooperation. Its purpose is not prescriptive, but aims to
describe the capabilities needed for effective child protection, highlight good practice
from countries that are already delivering these capabilities, and signpost organisa-
tions that can provide further guidance and support to countries seeking to develop or
enhance their existing capability. This tool is an interesting development as it brings
together, in an accessible format, international frameworks as well as the substantial
contributions made by organisations such as the United Nations, ECPAT and ICMEC.
2 Scale of the problem
In September 2019 the New York Times noted that in the previous year technol-
ogy companies reported to the US National Center for Missing and Exploited Chil-
dren (NCMEC) over 45 million photographs and videos of children being sexually
abused. This was more than twice the number reported in the previous year.14 The
8Lanzarote Committee - Opinion on Article 23 of the Lanzarote Convention and its explanatory
note (2016). Available at: https://edoc.coe.int/en/children-s-rights/7064-lanzarote-committee-opinion-
on-article-23-of-the-lanzarote-convention-and-its-explanatory-note.html.
9Hessick, C.B. [29].
10Gewirtz-Meydan, A., et al. [23].
11Gassó, A., et al. [22].
12Maas, M., et al. [40].
13Pashang, S., et al. [54].
14Keller, M.H. & Dance, G.J.X. [36].
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article made reference to research completed in 2019 in collaboration with NCMEC
which stated that “. . . online sharing platforms have accelerated the pace of CSAI
[child sexual abuse image] content creation and distribution to a breaking point where
NCMEC’s manual review capabilities and law enforcement investigations no longer
scale” (p1).15 This study used anonymised metadata associated with the 23,494,983
NCMEC reports related to suspected CSAI that were received from March, 1998
(when NCMEC’s CyberTipline was created) until September 2017. NCMEC reports
come from the US public and many US ESPs (electronic service providers) and over
9.6 million such reports (40%) occurred in the year 2017 (approximately one million
per month) compared to the 565 000 reports (2.4%) in its first ten years of operation.
While meaningful estimates of these crimes are highly problematic,16 it has been
argued that there are essentially four ways in which online-facilitated child sexual
abuse (OCSA) can be measured: by counting the number of offences committed, the
number of perpetrators, the number of victims and the number of images that have
been viewed, downloaded and exchanged. However, these authors note that quan-
tification based on each of these four measures inevitably produces very different
figures, partly because they are attempting to count different aspects of OCSA. How-
ever, there is converging evidence that sexual image-related crimes against children
are increasing, although a recent meta-analysis of the prevalence of online solicitation
amongst youth (one specific form of online child sexual abuse) would indicate that
one in nine young people experience online solicitation, although prevalence rates
have decreased over time.17
3 Cybercrime
Online child sexual abuse (OCSA) can be positioned as a cybercrime in which tech-
nology plays a role across a broad spectrum of activities. The definition of cybercrime
has been described as highly contentious, as while many people agree that cyber-
crime exists, they are not really clear what it is.18 In this respect, cybercrime has
developed from earlier concepts of computer crime and e-crime and has broadened
to cover many different forms of criminal activity. The European Crime Prevention
Network19 has also argued that there is a current absence of any consistent defini-
tion, and even within specific legislative documents cybercrime is used in different
ways. For example, the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention uses broad crim-
inalisation headings in its definition of cybercrime, including ‘offences against the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems,’ ‘computer-
related offences’, ‘content-related offences’ and ‘copyright-related offences’.20
15Bursztein, E., et al. [7].
16Wager, N., et al. [71].
17Madigan, S., et al. [41].
18Wall, D.S. [72].
19EUCPN. Cybercrime: a theoretical overview of the growing digital threat. In: EUCPN Secretariat (eds.),
EUCPN Theoretical Paper Series, European Crime Prevention Network: Brussels (2015).
20Council of the European Union. Convention on Cybercrime, Budapest, 23 November (2001).
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Many researchers and practitioners21 use ‘cyber-dependent crime’ and ‘cyber-
enabled crime’ or ‘cyber-assisted crime’ to classify different forms of cybercrime. At
one end of the cybercrime spectrum there is ‘cyber-assisted’ crime in which the Inter-
net is used in its organisation and implementation, but which would still take place if
the Internet was removed (e.g. a potential offender using online social media to locate
a child who is sexually assaulted off-line). At the other end of the spectrum is ‘cyber-
dependent’ crime, which exists because of the Internet, such as DDoS (distributed
denial-of-service) attacks or spamming. Differentiating between cyber-assisted crime
and cyber-enabled crime is at times very difficult, but it would appear that the bound-
aries between cybercrime and traditional forms of crime have never been clear cut
and are becoming increasingly blurred due to the level of hyper-connectivity in to-
day’s highly digitised and networked world.22 The ubiquitous use of the Internet and
smart mobile devices in people’s everyday lives, the wide adoption of cloud-based
services by industry and government, and, for example, the advent of the Internet of
Things (IoT), the Internet of Everything (IoE), and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs),
have led to the widely accepted belief that almost all criminal activities include some
cyber elements.23 As a consequence, digital forensics (sometimes called cyber foren-
sics) have become an essential part of almost all crime investigation processes for law
enforcement around the world.24
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime25 also argues that there is no
international definition of cybercrime or cyberattacks, but while they use the cyber-
enabled-cyber-dependent dichotomy, they add a further specific-crime type: online
child sexual exploitation and abuse, which includes abuse on the clear internet, dark-
net forums and, increasingly, the exploitation of self-created imagery via extortion
- known as “sextortion”. Quayle expanded these crimes to include the production,
dissemination and possession of child sexual abuse images (known in many jurisdic-
tions as child pornography); online grooming of children for sexual purposes; ‘sex-
ting’; sexual extortion of children (‘sextortion’); revenge pornography; commercial
sexual exploitation of children; exploitation of children through online prostitution,
and live streaming of sexual abuse.26 Other authors have defined OCSA as sexual
abuse of children involving force or enticement to take part in sexual activities where
the online environment is involved at any stage of the offence.27 This includes the
production, preparation, consumption, sharing, dissemination or possession of child
sexual abuse material and the solicitation of children for sexual purposes of children
(sometimes called ‘grooming’), whether or not it results, or is intended to result, in
a contact offence. In high to middle income countries, technology now mediates al-
most all human activities in some ways, including those of children, which makes
21McGuire, M. & Dowling, S. [45].
22Sarre, R., et al. [60].
23Miraz, M., et al. [49].
24EUROPOL. Internet organised crime threat assessment (2018). Available at: https://www.europol.
europa.eu/internet-organised-crime-threat-assessment-2018.
25UNOCDC Cybercrime (2019). Available at: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/cybercrime/index.html.
26Quayle, E. [55].
27May-Chahal, C., Palmer, E. [44].
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an analysis of clear distinctions between offline and online abuse difficult. Digital
technologies are embedded in our everyday practices and form an intrinsic part of
private and public experiences. Yet whilst creating opportunities for children to act as
receivers, participants and actors in the digital world, the Internet also creates spaces
of social interaction which hold the potential for exposure to online risks, including
sexual risks such as abuse and exploitation.
4 Cybercrime migration?
What is important to note, is that while there is converging evidence in some coun-
tries to support falling rates of non-technology-mediated child victimisation, includ-
ing child sexual abuse28,29,30,31 this does not appear to be the case in relation to
some forms of OCSA. It is easy to speculate as to whether there is a relationship
between the decrease in offline CSA and an increase in OCSA, and whether there has
been a migration from one to the other. It is, however, much more difficult to evi-
dence this. Probably the largest number of convictions for cyber sexual crimes relate
to possession of CSAM32 and this may relate to the forensic evidence available for
law enforcement to secure a conviction.33 Many, if not all, people charged with pos-
session will have a ‘permanent product’ of that crime available to law enforcement:
pictures and videos depicting child abuse and exploitation that meet the criteria in that
jurisdiction for illegality. It might be argued that this (as opposed to the evidence re-
quired for prosecution of a contact offence against a child) will increase the number
of successful convictions. However, though not without its critics, the ‘cybercrime
hypothesis’ has been used to account for a reduction of crime in other areas.34
Miró-Llinares and Moneva present two hypotheses which they argue highlight the
essential role of cyberspace as an environment that has shifted criminal opportunities
from physical to virtual space and which ultimately reflects on crime trends.35 The
first hypothesis provides evidence that the more time spent at home by many young
people engaging with, for example, video games and other online activities, could
have had an impact on the drop in juvenile crime. Their second hypothesis states,
which has relevance for this paper, that the appearance of cyberspace has led to a
shift in opportunities from physical space to cyberspace. This seems particularly per-
tinent in relation to online grooming or sexual solicitation. For example, a survey of
law enforcement36 indicated that social networking sites (SNSs) were used to initiate
28Finkelhor, D., Jones, L. [19].
29Laaksonen, T., et al. [37].
30Dunne, M., et al. [15].
31Shields, M., et al. [63].
32Wolak, J., et al. [75].
33Walsh, W., et al. [73].
34Farrell, G., Birks, D. [17].
35Miro-Llinares, F., Moneva, A. [50].
36Mitchell, K.J., et al. [51].
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sexual relationships, to provide a means of communication between victim and of-
fender, to access information about the victim, to disseminate information or pictures
about the victim, and to get in touch with the victim’s friends; SNSs might be said to
‘afford’ opportunities for offending. In a similar way, what has been noted in offender
samples is the ease that online sexual behaviour can take place, often prompted by
the easy exchange of photographs, text or the presence of web cameras, without any
physical contact, or the risks that would be associated with it.37
5 Affordances
Positioning OCSEA as cybercrimes forces us to think about the context in which
these abuses and exploitations take place. This potentially may offer ways of prevent-
ing or managing these crimes and moves us away from a focus on the characteristics
of offenders or their victims (and how it may be possible to effect changes in their
behaviour). In the context of young people’s mental health and digital environments
it has been suggested that digital technologies have their own affordances, which are
listed as persistence, replicability, scalability and searchability.38 The affordances of
digital technology (in conjunction with the capabilities of online and networked tech-
nology such as social media) allow digital information to be easily copied (replica-
bility), easily shared with large audiences (scalability), easily recorded and archived
(persistence), and easily accessed by others and found in the future (searchability).
Livingstone argues that these affordances are:
“the result of complex networked infrastructures invented and implemented by
people working under huge pressure and at speed in, largely, commercial in-
stitutions with global ambitions. That means the needs of vulnerable young
people may come very low down in their list of priorities. How far researchers,
clinicians and other practitioners can wrest back control to ensure digital net-
works meet the best interests of young people is as yet unknown, though surely
a struggle worth the effort”.39
This has been explored in the context of ‘revenge porn’ (non-consensual inti-
mate image distribution) where it is argued that replicability and scalability have
increased the ease with which such an act can be committed and the ease with which
a nude/sexual image can be distributed to a large audience.40 Persistence and search-
ability have also augmented impact of this act in some cases by allowing this content
to be located by others and to potentially affect a victim at some point in the future.
However, Dodge is critical of the decontextualised ways in which, for example the ju-
diciary have universally used these digital affordances to justify harsh sentences and
this is further explored in a discussion of ‘affordances-in-practice’ which stresses the
37Quayle, E., et al. [57].
38Boyd, D. [3].
39Livingstone, S. [38].
40Dodge, A. [14].
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idea that ‘affordances are not intrinsic properties that can be defined outside their sit-
uated context of usage, but ongoing enactments by specific users that may vary across
space and time’ (p3653).41
The term ‘affordance’ is used throughout this paper and this warrants further dis-
cussion. For Gibson, affordances referred to the possibilities that an object offers for
action, where the properties of the object emerge through the interaction between
actors and those objects.42 This is not only related to the physical properties of the
object but also to social norms and rules.43 The concept was further developed in re-
lation to human-computer interaction, where it was argued that an affordance should
not be understood as a property but rather as a relationship.44 It is therefore not a
static feature of an object and whether an affordance exists depends entirely on the
relationship between the actor and the property. Norman argued that the concept of
affordances does not imply that online practices are determined by technology, but
rather by how people use it. Therefore, affordances are not static features of tech-
nology, but have a number of potential actions associated with them. An affordance
exists once a user has perceived it and perceived the potential actions associated with
it. For example, Voice over Internet Protocols (such as Skype) have not only been
used by many people to keep in touch with geographically distant family members45
but also to facilitate the live streaming of sexual abuse of children. There are reports
of live streaming in South Asia with victims described as deprived children who are
coerced into live streaming of sexual abuse, from computers provided by employers,
against their will.46 However, live streaming has also been reported in high-income
countries such as the UK.47 Live streaming provides real-time access to events for
participants who are not actually engaging in the activity themselves. The UK’s Na-
tional Crime Agency’s strategic assessment of serious organised crime suggested that
“the practice of live streaming is one example of how offenders can simultaneously
create indecent images of children (IIOC) online, view IIOC, and commit contact
abuse by proxy overseas”.48 A case study on Periscope (a live streaming platform)
provides a forensic examination of the technical and legal challenges for the investi-
gation of live streaming of sexual abuse.49 This is a good illustration of how actors
may use technologies in creative and unpredictable ways.50
41Costa, E. [12].
42Gibson, J.J. [24].
43Meredith, J. [46].
44Norman, D.A. [53].
45Share, M., et al. [62].
46Brown, R., et al. [6].
47Internet Watch Foundation (2018). Available at: https://www.iwf.org.uk/news/iwf-research-on-child-sex-
abuse-live-streaming-reveals-98-of-victims-are-13-or-under.
48National Crime Agency. National strategic assessment of serious and organised crime 2016. Available at:
http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/731-national-strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-
organised-crime-2016/file.
49Horsman, G. [30].
50Jarzabkowski, P., Kaplan, S. [31].
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It has also been argued that the Internet creates affordances that facilitate innova-
tive ways of committing old and new crimes51 and Jerde suggests child sexual abuse
material (CSAM) as an example of crime that uses Internet affordances to “circum-
vent law enforcement techniques deployed around national borders to avoid detec-
tion”52 (p 2). A further study in the context of cyberbullying on social networking
sites (SNSs) used affordance to refer to the mutuality of actor intentions and tech-
nology capabilities that provide the potential for a particular action.53 This relational
view of affordance is seen as advantageous for understanding technology use because
it allows us to consider the symbiotic relationship between the capabilities of the
technology and the actor’s goal and actions. It has been argued that the actualisation
of affordances occurs when an actor takes advantage of one or more affordances of
SNSs to achieve immediate concrete outcomes that support their goals. The focus is
therefore on contextualised actions that technology makes qualitatively easier54 but
which may be specific to that relationality and which potentially move researchers
away from the certainties of separate technology attributes and actors’ attitudes.55
6 Technological affordances and CSAM
Technological affordances have also been considered in the context of an interac-
tion between design and usage and an example of this is privacy settings, where
affordances shape practice in that privacy settings distinguish between public, pri-
vate or partially private communications.56 However, as previously noted, users also
shape affordances, for example, young people setting up multiple profiles on SNSs to
project different selves to different audiences. Earlier work in this area suggested that
we can also identify ‘social affordances’ that refer to interactions between how users
respond, the social context and social networks.57 However, it has been argued that
other people provide the richest and most significant environmental affordances.58
One finding, of interest in relation to online grooming of children, is that technolog-
ical affordances are related to the motivations people have for using them. It is not
only important to think about what these ‘action possibilities’ are, but when and for
whom they might happen. For adolescents this may relate to the developmental task
of exploring sexuality, afforded through the ability to create sexual media, the on-
line applications that support this (e.g. WhatsApp, Instagram), and the peer and adult
engagement with this digital content. Of importance, it has been noted that new tech-
nologies reshape public life, but teens’ engagement also reconfigures the technology
itself. In the context of technology-mediated CSA, consideration of the reciprocity of
51Robey, D., et al. [59].
52Jerde, R. [32].
53Chan, T., et al. [9].
54Earl, J., Kimport, K. [16].
55Majchrzak, A., et al. [42].
56Staksrud, E., et al. [64].
57Wellman, B., et al. [74].
58Kaufmann, L., Clément, F. [35].
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this engagement needs to be widened to include another set of actors - those moti-
vated by a sexual interest in children.
Crime opportunity theory59 and the affordance perspective has been used to de-
velop a meta-framework to inform an understanding of SNS bullying.60 Specifically,
crime opportunity theory argues that two primary components contribute to a crime
being committed: a likely perpetrator, and environmental conditions that offer crim-
inogenic opportunities. In this context using an affordance perspective into crime
opportunity theory helped explain how social media allows a perpetrator to evalu-
ate whether environmental conditions would facilitate SNS bullying activity. In their
empirical study they proposed two SNS environmental conditions that offered crim-
inogenic opportunities for a likely offender to engage in SNS bullying. These were
the presence of suitable targets and the absence of capable guardianships. The af-
fordances that facilitated the identification of suitable targets, and which have rele-
vance for technology-mediated sexual abuse offences, were accessibility, information
retrieval, editability, and association. The first two of these (accessibility and infor-
mation retrieval) are particularly salient for OCSA crimes. Accessibility affordance
allows a perpetrator to transcend time and spatial constraints to reach potential targets
and provides the opportunity to connect with an unlimited number of users, including
people who are known and also unknown, leading to an environment where suitable
targets can be identified and accessed. Information retrieval affordance refers to the
extent to which a user believes that an SNS offers the opportunity to obtain informa-
tion about a user on that platform. This allows a likely offender to access material
created by a potential target, which provides information about the background, pref-
erences, and daily activities of that individual. These authors note that SNS updates
often include new features that encourage users to continuously create and share in-
formation on these platforms.
Earlier work had also used these frameworks to understand CSAM-related
crimes.61 Their starting point was routine activity theory 62 which identified three
minimal elements for criminal action: i. a likely offender; ii. a suitable target, and
iii. absence of a capable guardian. Focus on access to a suitable target, as with the
meta-framework developed in relation to bullying, drew attention to the context in
which potential criminal activity takes place which can be modified or changed. This
moves the focus away from the ‘likely offender’ and the likely circumstances (both
distal and proximal) that might have influenced their behaviour to the possibility of
changing the environment in a way that increases or supplements the availability of
capable guardianship. It distinguishes between the inclination to offend and the ac-
tual offence. Analysing criminal activity, which is both particular and grounded in
its situational context, should therefore relate to the context and circumstances of a
particular situation.
In the context of CSAM, the absence of a capable guardian seems particularly
pertinent. In November 2019 the BBC news reported (along with other agencies) the
59Felson, M., Clarke, R. [18].
60Ibid. 29.
61Taylor, M., Quayle, E. [68].
62Cohen, L.E., Felson, M. [10].
Prevention, disruption and deterrence of online child sexual. . .
decision by Facebook to encrypt all of its messenger services, ‘The end-to-end en-
cryption on Facebook-owned WhatsApp will be extended to Facebook Messenger
and Instagram, with Mr Zuckerberg [CEO Facebook] acknowledging there would
be a “trade-off” that would benefit child sex abusers and other criminals’.63 While
there is limited evidence for the purposeful use of encryption by offenders to conceal
online sexual activities against minors,64 tools such as WhatsApp, which have end
to end encryption, protect the data during transmission (and storage) by default.65
This also means that the applications used by organisations such as NCMEC and the
Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) to detect and remove CSAM content (such as Pho-
toDNA) may no longer have the same efficacy. PhotoDNA creates a unique digital
signature (“hash”) of an image which is then compared with hashes of other photos
to find copies of the same image. When matched with a database containing hashes
of previously identified illegal images, PhotoDNA helps detect, disrupt and report
the distribution of child exploitation material.66 Paradoxically, encryption by default
may provide an environment which perpetuates the sense of privacy and anonymity
associated with such applications. A recent study, albeit within a different context,
concluded that new app developers need to be mindful of the affordances of the prod-
ucts they develop,67 and in terms of online child protection this may be crucial.
7 Criminogenic qualities of the Internet
Recently there have been a number of studies examining the criminogenic quali-
ties of the Internet.68,69 It has been argued that situations vary in their criminogenic
qualities (producing or leading to crime), from those that challenge offenders by re-
quiring them to create opportunities, through those that provide easy temptations,
to those that actively provoke crime.70 Importantly, Wortley considers the interaction
between criminogenic environments and the criminogenic disposition of the likely of-
fender. The latter has its roots in an offender typology which is based on the strength
of criminal dispositions and the different roles played in their crimes by the imme-
diate environment.71 In this typology, anti-social predators may actively seek out
criminal opportunities and use situational information to make rational choices about
the risks and benefits of committing an act. Mundane offenders engage in low-level
crime and seem to demonstrate poor self-control and succumb easily to the oppor-
tunities offered in a given situation. The final category, provoked offenders, are less
63BBC News. Facebook removes 11.6 million child abuse posts (2019). Available at: https://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/technology-50404812.
64Steel, C., et al. [66].
65Loeb, J. [39].
66Microsoft PhotoDNA (2019). Available at: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/PhotoDNA.
67Moreno, M.A., D’Angelo, J. [52].
68Reyns, B., et al. [58].
69Brewer, R., et al. [5].
70Wortley, R. [76].
71Cornish, D.B., Clarke, R.V. [11].
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likely to have a criminal record but react to an array of situational conditions, some
which may be internal and others environmental. Related to this, Seto described a
motivation-facilitation model of sex offending which examined the relationships be-
tween paraphilic traits (predispositions), state factors (which facilitate acting on these
predispositions) and situational factors (access and presence of a capable guardian).72
This was examined in the context of CSAM offenders and concluded that many of
these individuals are motivated to engage in sexual behaviour with children as they
have paedophilic or hebephilic sexual interests, but that they demonstrate high levels
of self-control (or low in facilitation factors). This leaves them less likely to commit a
contact offence but this, in the context of access to Internet technologies, is not suffi-
cient to inhibit acting on the opportunity to commit CSAM offences. These offenders
have also been found to have greater access to technology but less access to children
than contact offenders.73
These issues are also examined in Brewer et al.’s study on adolescent delinquency
and the criminogenic features of digital technology.74 These authors argue that the
Internet exhibits features that make it uniquely criminogenic to offline environments.
The Internet as a distinct ‘place’ is said to de-territorialize encounters which are no
longer limited by geography and can take place in synchronous or asynchronous time,
which enable identity and motives to remain concealed. They suggest that, ‘Users can
easily move from a point of predictable use (e.g. targeted information searches) to ap-
parently random and unpredictable discoveries of information, images and points of
view due to the multiple ‘hidden’ linkages between websites and services that are
often driven by commercial considerations” (p 118). Algorithms may also direct or
nudge users to certain content or services based on past individual or collective activ-
ity. It has been argued that these algorithms can be specifically designed to capitalize
on cravings and curiosities (and they may well have affordance qualities).75
A topical example of this relates to YouTube’s video recommendation system
which displays on a sidebar what is ‘up next’ for the viewer.76 These are ranked
according to the user’s history and context, and newer videos are generally prefer-
enced. A publication in the New York Times reported that YouTube’s algorithm was
encouraging people with a sexual interest in children to watch videos of partially
clothed minors, often after viewing videos with sexual content. These videos were
often domestic and showed children at the swimming pool or on vacation, but their
report claimed that there was evidence that for some of the people watching them they
were serving a different (and possibly sexual) purpose.77 A technical paper by three
Google employees discussed the deep neural networks for YouTube recommenda-
tions and stated that a two-stage approach allows recommendations to be made from
a very large corpus (millions) of videos while still being certain that the small num-
72Seto, M.C. [61].
73Babchishin, K.M., et al. [1].
74Ibid. 55.
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ber of videos appearing on the device are personalized and engaging for the user.78
Our viewing history will determine what we are ‘nudged’ to view, and potentially
for a number of individuals will increase the likelihood of viewing content that may
approximate sexually inappropriate or illegal content.
It has been suggested that there are qualities of the Internet either in association
with facilitating conditions (personal or environmental) or otherwise that in them-
selves made accessing and possession of CSAM more likely and in essence operate
as ‘event’ factors (that relate to the commission of this particular crime).79 This ar-
gument was framed within an analysis drawing on a situational crime control model,
which emphasises the significance of pre-criminal situations and opportunity. Tay-
lor drew parallels between terrorist activities and CSAM-related crimes and argues
that some forms of user interaction with the Internet suggest the Internet may have
criminogenic qualities.80 Firstly, the distributed nature of the Internet and the corre-
sponding lack of control over content is a factor in increased availability of illegal or
undesirable material. Secondly, the way that distributed complex global microstruc-
tures develop effectively increases opportunity for access to that content. Alongside
this, criminal conspiracies can deliberately and intentionally use both content and
opportunity to engage with, and draw in, otherwise uncommitted people.
8 Practice implications for prevention
Changing individuals (likely offenders and likely targets) is both challenging and
expensive. Over the last 20 years there has been a development of a number of inter-
net safety and education programmes to increase positive adolescent behaviour and
safety online but their findings from a systematic review of related studies suggested
that there is still a need for re-evaluating how internet safety education is delivered
in the future.81 In a further publication a content analysis of four Internet Safety Ed-
ucation Programmes for children indicated that most were not incorporating proven
education strategies and lacked any strong evidence base82 although a more recent
study does advocate for the alignment of such programmes with a clearer evidence
base.83 They also challenged whether messages would be better delivered through
broader youth safety prevention programs versus stand-alone lessons. Intervention
programmes that target online offenders have shown equivocal evidence. For exam-
ple, the UK-accredited treatment programme (iSOTP) was assessed following com-
pletion of pre and post-psychometric assessments by 264 convicted offenders and in-
dicated improvements in socio-affective functioning and a decrease in pro-offending
attitudes.84 An evaluation of the psycho-educational programme Inform and Inform
78Covington, P., et al. [13].
79Taylor, M., Quayle, E. [69].
80Taylor, Max. [67].
81Jones, L.M., et al. [34].
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Plus, developed in the UK by The Lucy Faithful Foundation suggested that data from
eleven groups indicated that participants felt enabled to face up to being arrested
and/or convicted, helped them develop a greater understanding of their offending be-
haviour and how to establish a non-offending life.85 However, an Impact evaluation
of the UK prison-based Core Sex Offender Treatment Programme between 2000 and
2012 indicated that more treated sex offenders committed at least one child image
reoffence during the follow-up period when compared with the matched comparison
offenders who had received no treatment (4.4% compared with 2.9 %).86
It seems likely that changing the contexts in which sexual crimes take place may
offer greater opportunity to effect change. Wortley (2012) comments that the most
common model of situation prevention is opportunity reduction, which involves ma-
nipulating the immediate environmental contingencies so as to increase the perceived
costs of offending.87 He applies this to the problem of CSAM through an examina-
tion of three opportunity-reduction strategies: reducing perceived rewards, increas-
ing the perceived effort and increasing the perceived risks. Reducing the rewards of
CSAM may involve removing or denying access to content that is targeted by offend-
ers through, for example, regulatory control of content by Internet Service Providers.
Disruption tactics, such as blocking efforts by Google and Microsoft, resulted in a
67% drop over 12 months in web-based searches for abuse images compared with
no blocking activities from Yandex.88 There are some positive indicators in rela-
tion to Internet monitoring, moderation, and reporting of problematic content or be-
haviour.89 One example is the development of a web crawler (Arachnid) by the Cana-
dian Centre for Child Protection to detect images and videos based on confirmed dig-
ital fingerprints of illegal content and combat the proliferation of child sexual abuse
material on the Internet. They report that the automated crawler helps reduce the on-
line availability of child sexual abuse material through its identification and issuing
of a notice to the hosting provider requesting its removal. As of November 2019,
over 13.3 million images were identified for analyst review and 4.7 million notices
were sent to providers. Of these, 85% of related to victims who are not known to
have been identified by police.90 Such disruption tactics reduce the number of im-
ages available through simple searching, which is important as the presence of easily
available CSAM, and high levels of Internet use, are risk factors in Internet offending.
Increasing the perceived effort of accessing CSAM involves making it more difficult
for offenders to gain access to content, which means they have to expend more effort.
A publication by the Mobile Alliance Against Child Sexual Abuse Content presents
a collation of approaches that have been proved successful in deterring or detecting
illegal or illicit use of mobile payment services used to access CSAM.91 It is also
85Gillespie, S., et al. [27].
86Mews, A., et al. [47].
87Ibid. 56.
88Steel, C. [65].
89Quayle, E., Koukopoulos, N. [56].
90Project Arachnid. Available at: https://www.cybertip.ca/app/en/projects-arachnid.
91Mobile Alliance Against Child Sexual Abuse Content. Preventing mobile payment services from
being misused to monetise child sexual abuse content (2014). Available at: https://www.gsma.com/
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likely that increasing perceived risks may be achieved through proactive policing.
One example of this is provided by the EUROPOL initiative Police2Peer which in-
volves law enforcement informing people trying to access or share CSAM on P2P
networks of the risks that they are taking and offering information as to where they
can get help.
In a similar vein, attention has been drawn to the particular context in which access
to CSAM occurs, which firmly locates the behaviour within the factors that influence
it. These have been summarized as: the significance of high affordance cues giving
access to images; immediate and highly salient reinforcement on achieving access
to images; perceived absence of capable guardianship and surveillance (in a general
sense as far as the Internet is concerned, and in a specific sense in terms of the privacy
associated with Internet use); insensitivity to immediate negative qualities resulting
from both motivational factors and the strong affordance qualities of screen based
cues.92 Three kinds of crime prevention initiatives have been identified which may
be of value in helping to place this into context: primary prevention (focused on stop-
ping a crime before it occurs); secondary prevention (directed at people thought to
be at high risk of committing an offence) and tertiary prevention (focused on known
offenders).93 These categories were used to explore prevention efforts in relation to
CSAM using two additional crime prevention categories: reducing provocation and
removing excuses. Removing excuses (for example, through informing target audi-
ences of the illegality of CSAM and its associated harms to children) through me-
dia campaigns have provided evidence that these represent an effective way to reach
a large audience and transmit the messages that there are significant consequences
to viewing CSAM, individuals have personal responsibility in controlling their be-
haviour, and that help is available. In this respect, campaigns appear to be an appro-
priate strategy for deterring people from viewing CSAM, that sits alongside other
initiatives.94
9 Conclusion
While there is no evidence to suggest that online abuse and exploitation are more
serious or pervasive offences than crimes occurring offline, it is the case that the
affordances offered by online social media may present a significant risk factor for
some children. Three factors play an important role in this complex and dynamic
scenario: potential perpetrators and victims, the social context in which criminal ac-
tivities take place and the rapidly changing medium. In this paper an argument has
been presented that changing the environments that supports OCSA is necessary if
we are to detect and manage these crimes, and more importantly prevent them. In
publicpolicy/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/GSMA2014_Report_PreventingMobilePaymentServicesFrom
BeingMisusedToMonetiseChildSexualAbuseContent.pdf.
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2019 the Child Dignity Alliance produced a Technical Working Group Report which
examined the role of technology in combating the proliferation of online child sexual
exploitation and abuse imagery. Critically, the report recommended that IT companies
such as Facebook, Google and Microsoft should continue to: support the efforts of
law-enforcement, government and non-profit agencies through sharing key technical
and operational data; to share technology that tackles child sexual abuse imagery; to
share operational data about those abusing their networks; to improve the verification
of customer identity when new domains are registered or renewed, and to proactively
identify threat actors and vulnerable users. Such changes, along with the technical so-
lutions that flow from them, offer the only scalable interventions in relation to these
crimes. Yet it is clear that prevention of OCSA is in its infancy and that, as argued by
Carr, the response from the IT industry in increased proactive deployment and effec-
tiveness of tools used to detect and deter CSAI is, while welcome, still partial with
many of the key organisations not fully engaged.95
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